HESA

Higher Education Strategy Associates

Tag Archives: Subsidies

March 15

ECE Contributions vs. PSE Contributions

Morning all.  Today, HESA is releasing a paper called “What We Ask of Parents: Unequal Expectations for Parental Contributions to Early-Childhood and Post-Secondary Education in Canada”, by Jacqueline Lambert, Jonathan Williams, and me.  The gist of it is: “Holy cow, we ask parents to contribute a lot more to ECE than PSE – why is that?” You can click here to read the whole report, or you can see the short version as an op-ed in today’s Globe and Mail.  What I want to show you in today’s blog is the wonky background stuff, because we’ve done a couple of things in this paper that no one has done before.

The paper is really built around the key insight that you can create “expected contribution curves” for both early-childhood education (ECE) and post-secondary education (PSE). In PSE, you can do this simply by looking at the parental contribution tables embedded in student financial aid programs, and then add in the value of tax credits.  You’ve seen me do stuff like this before, but here’s what it looks like for PSE:

Figure 1: Net-After Tax Expected Parental Contributions for Parents of Children in PSE, Canada 2015

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You can see pretty clearly what’s going on here.  Below about $15,000 the expected contribution is $0 – no contribution required, but income levels are too low for any taxes to kick in, so no tax credits, either.   As income starts to rise, net contribution falls because of the value of tax credits.  But then, expected contributions from the student aid system kick in: at about $45,000 in the case of Quebec, and around $60,000 elsewhere (as a result, despite low tuition, Quebec is the place where parents are expected to pay the most, if their income is between $45,000 and $70,000).  The exception to this is Alberta, where no parental contribution is required at all.  I’ll come back to that.

Eventually, this graph shows that contributions flatten out at a level equal to tuition and fees, which is the maximum possible contribution in this exercise.  Now, I’m pretty sure this will tick a lot of people off because at least some parents also support students for their living expenses, and we’re excluding them, and hence making contributions look smaller than they really are.  This is true – and we do it in part because actual living expenses are quite variable and difficult to model.  But that doesn’t mean we’re exaggerating the difference between expected contributions to ECE and PSE – after all, parents of children in ECE are paying for their kids’ living expenses too.  So we just call all of that a wash and focus on what parents are paying in fees to daycares and universities.

Anyways, for early childhood education you can draw very similar curves to the ones in Figure 1 by taking the average child care costs and applying the subsidies available to low income parents according to the provincial formula.  No one seems to have ever done this before in Canada, but it can be done.  You have to do it three times, because outside Quebec, prices tend to differ by the age of the child (infants are more expensive than toddlers, who are more expensive than pre-schoolers), but it is eminently doable.  Here’s what the graph looks like for infants, after tax deductions are applied:

Figure 2: Net-After Tax Expected Parental Contributions for Parents of Toddlers in ECE, Canada, 2015

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As you can see, the story for ECE contribution is quite a different from the one for PSE.  For infants, the minimum contribution is almost never zero.  In most provinces, parents hit maximum contributions at between $45,000 and $70,000 in family income – a level where parents of PSE students are usually not required to contribute a thing.  To say we as a country are inconsistent in the way we pay for these two types of education is putting it mildly.

Anyways, in the paper itself (well, in the appendices anyway) we generate province-by-province comparisons like this one below, for Alberta:

Figure 3: Effective After-Tax Required Contributions for Parents of Dependent PSE Students and Children in Child-Care, by Family Income, Alberta, 2015

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Yeah, this graph is pretty crazy.  This is what happens when you say there shouldn’t be a parental contribution to post-secondary education, which Alberta did about five years ago.  At $75,000 in family income, the gap between required parental contributions for an infant and for a university student is a little over $14,000.  Madness.

And finally, by multiplying provincial values by each province’s share of population, we can generate some national averages.  To wit:

Figure 4: Average Effective After-Tax Required Contributions for Parents of Dependent PSE Students and Infants in ECE, by Family Income, Canada, 2015

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Fun, huh?

Tomorrow: the policy implications.

April 25

Nova Scotia Ditches a Bad Subsidy

About a decade ago, a really bad policy idea started making its way across the country’s “have-not” provinces.  I can’t remember if it started in Saskatchewan or New Brunswick, but within a couple of years it had spread to Manitoba and Nova Scotia, as well.  The details (and generosity) of this policy varied somewhat, but the gist of it was this: “let’s pay our graduates not to leave the province by refunding a portion of their tuition, via tax reductions, once they graduate”.  Sometimes this was dressed up as a “talent attraction policy”, in the sense that it would benefit people coming in from outside the province; in the main, however, it was understood that this money was mainly about keeping “our” kids at home.

Now this was a dumb idea from almost any policy perspective you can imagine, but the two most obvious ones are:

1)      Effectiveness.  Most youth, even in the most economically depressed provinces, tend to stay where they are: in the provinces where these programs were introduced, the “stay” rate ranged from about 75-85%.  So even if you bring the stay-rate up by 10 percentage points, that still means that for every student you successfully keep, eight others will get to keep cash for doing exactly what they were going to do anyway.

2)      Horizontal equity.  If you have a couple of tens of millions in cash that you want to devote to youth – and lord knows there isn’t much of that around – why in the name of all that’s holy would you hand that money over to the group of youth who are the most employable, and have the best prospects?  Especially if you’re not actually changing their behaviour, all this does is reduce the cost of education and make it easier for tomorrow’s upper-middle class to start accumulating assets.

Anyways, though it wasn’t much noticed outside the province, Nova Scotia dropped the tax rebate, largely because it was ineffective – young people continued to leave the province.  While it drained a lot of money, it simply wasn’t big enough to change many people’s minds about leaving.  And this makes sense: if the reason someone moves from Halifax to Toronto is a $10K/year difference in pay, a $2k tax rebate isn’t going to change their mind.

Of course, it would have been a lot better if the Nova Scotia Government had actually put that money back into some other youth-serving purpose – the community college, say, or student assistance (a category in which Nova Scotia remains among the most miserly in the country).  But with the province hemorrhaging money, it’s not exactly a surprise that this money is going straight to deficit-reduction, no matter how unfortunate that might be.

Interesting trend, though: first Quebec and now Nova Scotia have started dialling back on tax credits – with no apparent backlash.  Hopefully, this is the start of a trend that allows us to restore some sanity to the way we subsidise higher education.

March 19

The Canadian Way of Higher Education Subsidies

One of the biggest arguments in student assistance is about who to subsidize and why.  Unfortunately, because we are rarely explicit in the way we talk about subsidies, discussions tend to be a dialogue of the deaf.

One school of thought says we should subsidize students based on their parental income.  Students from poor families need more help to succeed than students from wealthier families, and so the former should pay less, and so we should pay them grants to reduce the net cost of attendance.  Then there’s a second school of thought, which says that the way to focus subsidies is to focus on needy graduates.  Forget the upfront subsidies: the people we need to support are the ones who don’t do well out of their education, and as a result remain low-income for years.   The third school of thought holds that everybody should receive the same subsidy no matter what their parents make, or what they make afterwards.  And then there’s a final school of thought, which says we should reward “good behaviour”, however defined.

Other countries are pretty explicit about their choices.  The Americans go pretty heavy on the parental income track (though the beneficial effects of this are counteracted by other funding and policy choices).  The UK is quite explicit about using the graduate income track as a means of subsidy: everybody borrows oodles of money to pay expensive tuition fees, and the ones who make out worse get these loans forgiven (eventually).  Much of Europe – especially Scandinavia – operates under the third school of thought, even at the price (in a few countries) of having an unnecessarily badly-funded system as a result.  The fourth view is surprisingly widely-held around the world, as it applies to anywhere that has a dual-track system of higher education (most of the ex-socialist countries of Europe, much of Latin American and Anglophone Africa) where “meritorious” students get first crack at the subsidies.

In Canada, we have a mish-mash of strategies, partly because we’re a federal system, so coherence is always a problem, and partly because we have a real tendency to reach for solutions before fully articulating the problem.  Our student aid system mostly works on the parental system, but allows students to declare independence relatively early (in practice, age 22), which effectively moves to the universal system.  We have a relatively generous Repayment Assistance Program (RAP), which uses the needy graduates approach.  And  though we aren’t especially heavy on merit awards, our $700M/year Canada Education Savings Grant, which rewards savers, is just a variant on the “reward good behaviour” approach.

You see, Canada just doesn’t do joined-up coordinated approaches; rather, we tend to just reach for whatever looks shiny, and implement it.  The result is a system that spends wildly in all directions, with nothing resembling an underlying philosophy.  Each individual program is arguably successful on its own terms, but the result is a system tha is arguably less successful than it could be if we focused spending on one or two of these pathways.

October 25

Daycare Subsidies, Tuition Subsidies

I see the Globe is currently doing a series on affordable child care.  It’s a good series, but it’s striking how different the tone is from public discussions on higher education, despite the evident similarities between the two policy fields.

This occurred to me a few months ago while reading a Globe op-ed from a new-ish parent, wondering why daycare was so unaffordable.  It was framed in the Globe’s very weird, class-politics manner, as: “My wife and I make $100,000 and we can’t afford daycare”.

(Sidebar for non-Torontonians: the tribes of downtown “Tronna” have literally no idea that a $100K family income puts them around the 80th income percentile, and that such whining makes the rest of Canada want to smack them upside the head.  Nice people, but clueless in this respect.)

One meme which keeps popping up here is that daycare users should receive greater subsidies, as day care is an expense that people incur at a time in their lives when they’re just starting out, have less capital, etc.  In higher ed, our answer to this problem is loans, which provide precisely this kind of income-smoothing.  So why not provide loans to help people afford daycare?

Think about it: both Early Childhood Education (ECE) and higher education are non-compulsory forms of education, which is why we ask people to pay for them (compulsory education should always be free).  In universities and colleges, we generously underwrite the education providers, and provide need-based aid – part loan, part grant – to help people who can’t afford to cover the remaining costs.  In most of the country, daycares are funded similarly, if less generously.  The outliers are Quebec, where funding comes almost entirely through core grants (with a little extra assistance available to low-income parents), and Ontario, where it comes mostly through individual fees (though significant subsidies for lower-income families exist).  Thus, outside Quebec, net price for daycare is on a sliding scale based on income, just as it is for university and college (though subsidies for daycare are MUCH simpler, and more transparent, than those for student aid – PSE could learn a lot from ECE in this respect).

So why not daycare loans (or “extended payment plans”, if the word “loans” is too icky)?  Why not give people like the author of this Globe op-ed piece – that is, people just outside the subsidy range (at $1500/month in fees, the subsidy in Toronto disappears at around $92,000), and who find it too burdensome to pay 25% of their after-tax income on daycare – a break by letting them pay fees over 6-8 years, rather than 3-4?  Unlike students, these are people with steady incomes – costs to the public should be minimal.

May 23

A Rare Piece of Good Policy in Quebec

So, although it wasn’t widely noticed at the time, one really excellent piece of policy came out of the crap-fest that was the Quebec Education Summit, a couple of weeks ago; it’s a policy that deserves a great deal of wider study and emulation.  For the first time in Canadian history, a government managed to get rid of a crappy tax credit, and use it to improve targeted, needs-based subsidies.

Here’s what happened. The PQ, during its naked bid to win the affections of students in the run-up to the 2012 election, promised students that not only would they rescind the tuition hike imposed by the Liberal government, but they would also uphold the generous new student aid package the Liberals offered as a sweetener.  But of course, that meant spending double – so they needed a new form of revenue, at a time when the provincial budget was under pressure.

Enter the tax credits.

Now, if you’ve at all been following student aid over the last decade, you’ll know that Canada went tax-credit crazy around about 1998.  Mostly, it was a federal thing – a way for the feds to get money to parents for education, without the tedious mucking about of negotiating deals with provinces.  But some provinces went along for the ride, too. In any case, the value of education tax credits rapidly surpassed the combined value of grants and loan remission.

Total Value of Education Tax Credits vs. Grants & Remission, Canada, 1990-91 to 2009-10, in Billions of 2010 Dollars

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Why does this matter?  Because tax credits are given out without regard to income or need.  And since kids from better-off backgrounds are more likely to go to PSE, tax credit expenditure, on aggregate, mostly ends up in the hands of people from the top 2 income quartiles.  Grants, on the other hand, are more likely to end up in the hands of people from the bottom 2 quartiles (the reason they don’t end up there entirely is because a lot kids from richer backgrounds get quite a lot of aid once they turn 22, and become “independent” students).

Distribution of Benefits by Income Quartile, for Selected Student Assistance Measures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Usher, A (2004) Who Gets What? The Distribution of Government Subsidies for Postsecondary Education in Canada. Toronto: Educational Policy Institute.   

Now, over the past decade, a number of groups have recommended replacing tax credits with grants of some kind – even the CFS, who bizarrely denounce tax credits as regressive, even though they have EXACTLY the same re-distributive consequences as the tuition cuts which the CFS backs so fervently (consistency is not their strong suit).  Almost everyone – bar Michael Ignatieff – ignored these calls, essentially on the grounds that  Canadians wouldn’t stand for what would amount to a tax hike.

Well, now the PQ has proved them wrong.  A government has converted a regressive universal program into a targeted progressive one, to no opposition whatsoever, even in a highly-taxed province.  Policy-makers in the rest of the country should take note.