Higher Education Strategy Associates

Category Archives: Ontario

November 24

Class Size, Teaching Loads, and that Curious CUDO Data Redux

You may recall that last week I posted some curious data from CUDO, which suggested that the ratio of undergraduate “classes” (we’re not entirely sure what this means) to full-time professors in Ontario was an amazingly-low 2.4 to 1.  Three quick follow-ups to that piece.

1.  In the previous post, I offered space on the blog to anyone involved with CUDO who could clear up the mystery of why undergraduate teaching loads appeared to be so low.  No one has taken me up this offer.  Poor show, but it’s not too late; I hereby repeat the offer in the hope that someone will step forward with something convincing.

2.  I had a couple of people – both in Arts faculties at different medium-sized non-U15 Ontario universities – try to explain the 2.4 number as follows: teaching loads *are* in fact 4 courses per year (2/2), they said.  It’s just that once you count sabbaticals, maternity leaves, high enrolment (profs sometimes get a reduced load if one of their classes is particularly large), leaves for administrative duty, and “buyouts” (i.e. a prof pays to have a sessional teach the class so he/she can do research), you come down to around 2.5.

This is sort of fascinating.  I mean, if this were generally true, it essentially means that universities are managing their staff on the assumption that 35-40% of staff resources are theoretically available for teaching.  Now, obviously all industries overstaff to some extent: sickleaves and maternity happen everywhere.  But 40%?  That sounds extremely high.  It does not speak particularly well of an institution that gets its money primarily for the purpose of teaching.  Again, it would be useful if someone in an institution could confirm/deny, but it’s a heck of a stat.

3.  Turns out there’s actually a way to check this, because at least one university – give it up for Carleton, everyone – actually makes statistics about sessional professors public!  Like, on their website, for everyone to seeMirabile dictu.

Anyways, what Carleton says is that in 2014-15, 1,397 “course sections” were taught by contract or retired faculty, which translates into 756.3 “credits”.  At the same time, the university says it has 850 academic staff (actually, 878, but I’m excluding the librarians here).  Assuming they are all meant to teach 2/2, this would be 3,400 “classes” per year.  Now, it’s not entirely clear to me whether the definition of “classes” is closer to “credits” or “course sections”; I kind of think it is somewhere in between.  If it’s the former, then contract/retired faculty are teaching 22.2% of all undergraduate classes; if it’s the latter, then it’s 41.1%.  That’s a wide range, but probably about right.  And since Carleton is a pretty typical Canadian university, my guess is these numbers roughly hold throughout the system.

However, what this doesn’t tell you is what percentage of credit hours are taught by sessionals – if the undergraduate classes taught by these academics are larger, on average, than those taught by full-timers, then the proportion will be even higher than this.  I’ve had numerous conversations with people in a position to know who indicate that in many Ontario Arts faculties, the percentage of undergraduate credit hours taught by sessional faculty is roughly 50%. Elsewhere, of course, mileage may vary, but my guess is that with the possible exception of the Atlantic, this is the case pretty much everywhere.

I could be wrong, of course.  As with my CUDO offer, anyone who wants to step forward with actual data to show how I am wrong is welcome to take over the blog for a couple of days to present the evidence.

November 17

Curious Data on Teaching Loads in Ontario

Back in 2006, university Presidents got so mad at Maclean’s that they stopped providing data to the publication.  Recognizing that this might create the impression that they had something to hide, they developed something called “Common University Dataset Ontario” (CUDO) to provide the public with a number of important quantitative descriptors of each university.  In theory, this data is of better quality and more reliable than the stuff they used to give Maclean’s.

One of the data elements in CUDO has to do with teaching and class size.  There’s a table for each university, which shows the distribution of class sizes in each “year” (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th): below 30, 31-60, 61-90, 91-150, 151-250, and over 250.  The table is done twice, once including just “classes”, and another with slightly different cut-points that include “subsections”, as well (things like laboratories and course sections).  I was picking through this data when I realised it could be used to take a crude look at teaching loads because the same CUDO data also provides a handy number of full-time professors at each institution.  Basically, instead of looking at the distribution of classes, all you have to do is add up the actual number of undergraduate classes offered, divide it by the number of professors, and you get the number of courses per professor.  That’s not a teaching load per se, because many courses are taught by sessionals, and hell will freeze over before institutions release data on that subject. Thus, any “courses per professor” data that can be derived from this exercise is going to overstate the amount of undergradaute teaching being done by full-time profs.

Below is a list of Ontario universities, arranged in ascending order of the number of undergraduate courses per full-time professor.  It also shows the number of courses per professor if all subsections are also included.  Of course, in most cases, at most institutions, subsections are not handled by full-time professors but some are; and so assuming the underlying numbers are real, a “true” measure of courses per professors would be somewhere in between the two.  And remember, these are classes per year, not per term.

Classes Per Professor, Ontario, 2013


















Yes, you’re reading that right.  According to universities’ own data, on average, professors are teaching just under two and a half classes per year, or a little over one course per semester.  At Toronto, McMaster, and Windsor, the average is less than one course per semester.  If you include subsections, the figure rises to three courses per semester, but of course as we know subsections aren’t usually led by professors.   And, let me just say this again, because we are not accounting for classes taught by sessionals, these are all overstatements of course loads.

Now these would be pretty scandalous numbers if they were measuring something real.  But I think it’s pretty clear that they are not.  Teaching loads at Nipissing are not five times higher than they are at Windsor; they are not three and a half times higher at Guelph than at Toronto.  They’re just not.  And nor is the use of sessional faculty quite so different from one institution to another as to produce these anomalies.  The only other explanation is that there is something wrong with the data.

The problem is: this is a pretty simple ratio; it’s just professors and classes.  The numbers of professors reported by each institution look about right to me, so there must be something odd about the way that most institutions – Trent, Lakehead, Guelph, and Nipissing perhaps excepted – are counting classes.  To put that another way, although it’s labelled “common data”, it probably isn’t.  Certainly, I know of at least one university where the class-size data used within the institution explicitly rejects the CUDO definitions (that is, they produce one set of figures for CUDO and another for internal use because senior management thinks the CUDO definitions are nonsense).

Basically, you have to pick an interpretation here: either teaching loads are much, much lower than we thought, or there is something seriously wrong with the CUDO data used to show class sizes.  For what it’s worth, my money is on it being more column B than column A.  But that’s scarcely better: if there is a problem with this data, what other CUDO data might be similarly problematic?  What’s the point of CUDO if the data is not in fact common?

It would be good if someone associated with the CUDO project could clear this up.  If anyone wants to try, I can give them this space for a day to offer a response.  But it had better be good, because this data is deeply, deeply weird.

June 02

Funding Formulas 201

The last time we  talked about funding formulas, we discussed the difference between determinative and allocative formulas.  When we talk about Ontario, which is currently undergoing a funding formula review, we’re definitely talking about the latter.  The formula isn’t going to drive total spending (this remains the legislature’s prerogative), what it is going to do is decide how the total amount will be split up.

The question is: how best to do this?

At this point, it’s worth going into some history about funding formulas.  Back in the day – say, the 1960s – universities would come cap-in-hand to government asking for money for various sundry purposes (usually, there were a couple of new “wow” proposals in there to justify a big increase), and government, in-turn, would cut cheques to individual institutions for any old amount.  Eventually, governments got tired of that shtick, and decided to come up with a way to allocate funds automatically – but fairly – to avoid going through that rigamarole every year.

Over time, however, global thinking about funding formulas changed – due mainly to work done at the OECD.  It’s now no longer just about divvying up money, it’s about using money to create a set of incentives to steer the system.  Now, admittedly, when the OECD talks about using money to steer a system, it does so because it thinks it’s better for governments to set goals for institutions, and then get out of the way.  In other words, governments “should steer, not row”.

(An interesting question in Ontario, of course, is how formula spending power can be made to steer the system, when the government of the day has a predilection not just to row, but to flail around like a five year-old on a boogie board.  Should be interesting.)

Anyhow, the idea is that you can get universities to do stuff by rewarding them via the funding formula.  The question then, from a practical point of view, is: how big a carrot do you need to get an institution to do something it may not want to do (e.g. pay more attention to teaching, get research institutions to reach out more to poorer kids, etc.)?  The answer here is: “nobody knows”.  And this is a bit of a problem, especially if you’re trying to incentivize something.  Thanks to the work of Nicholas Hillman and David Tandberg, we can be pretty sure that small nudges – say, nudges that account for 2-3% of the budget, or so – aren’t going to work.  If you’re going to try something like this, you need to go big.  As in, “at least 10% of an institutional budget” big.

Now, here’s the thing: in Ontario, the government only accounts for about 40% of university funding, with the rest coming from tuition or commercial activities.  So something that puts 10% of the institutional budget at risk actually has to put 25% of government funding at risk.  And logically speaking, this means you probably can only pick one, or at most two goals for your funding formula to target.   So what should the government pick: completion rates?  Research commercialization?

It’s hard, in fact, to see how you can steer competently in a way that makes sense for all institutions, in a jurisdiction where so little institutional funding comes from government.  There is the possibility of creating individual goals for each institution based on individual missions, but now you’re getting a long way from the idea of a “formula”, something where everyone pumps the same numbers into the system, and a global result for all institutions pops out.

Basically, system steering gets a lot tougher for governments if they’ve already allowed institutions to become mostly student-funded.  This is something Ontario is about to discover in a big way.

May 07

Funding Formulas 101

So I’ve been asked to act as a member of the “reference group” (that is, a group of individuals from whom advice may be sought, but which is not technically an advisory group – yeah, I know, it’s a bit odd) for the government of Ontario’s funding formula review.  Since everyone’s about open government these days, I thought I’d make public some of my views on the subject of funding formulae so you can get a sense of what I’m contributing to the discussion behind the scenes.

So, first off: does Ontario actually need a change to its funding formula?  For purely housekeeping reasons, yes.  It’s been about 40 years since the formula was last re-written, and it looks increasingly jerry-rigged (I can’t find a completely up-to-date version of the Ontario formula online, but here’s an ungated 2009 version that, minus some jiggery-pokery around education students, is still pretty much what’s in the system today).

But we need to be clear about what a funding formula amendment can achieve.  The government seems to be under the impression that a new funding system can help institutions better contain costs (it can’t), or support differentiation (it can, but only if you stretch the term “formula” to include a lot of stuff that isn’t particularly algebraic).  Other stakeholders seem to think that a funding formula change might improve financing for institutions.  This it can do in theory, but not – in Ontario at least – in practice.

At a very broad level, funding formulas come in two types: determinative and allocative.  In a determinative formula, the government plugs all the relevant numbers into a formula, and out the other end comes a number that tells the government how much to spend.  These are pretty rare: Australia has a system like this, as does the United Arab Emirates.  Governments tend to dislike these formulas because they hand control of overall spending to bodies outside of government: as long as universities keep admitting people, governments have to keep spending (in the UAE’s case, it also led to Treasury trying to meddle in the admissions process as a way to keep expenditures under control). Instead, most formulas are allocative: government determines how much it wants to spend, and then uses a formula to divide that amount between all the institutions.  That’s very definitely how Ontario’s formula works right now, and I think it is safe to say the current review isn’t going to change that.

Tinkering with an allocative formula will certainly make some universities better off, but by definition it can’t make them all better off.  Indeed, winners and losers tend to be more or less equally balanced.  You can tweak the formula to help institutions that are more research-focused, but small institutions will pay; you can put more money to fund Fine Arts programs, but other fields of study will have to lose money to balance it out.

Another thing about funding formulas: the amount of difference they make to institutional behaviour is basically proportional to the percentage of the total bill that government foots.  In Quebec, where institutions are dependent on government for 80% of their money, changes to funding formulas matter a heck of a lot more than they do in Ontario, where the government share of operating expenditures is closer to 40%.

All of which is to say: let’s not kid ourselves that this funding formula review is going to change very much.  This is a risk-averse government, which dislikes seeing too many losers.  For some reason, they have initiated a process that has the potential to create a lot of losers.  My best guess is there will be a lot of interesting ideas thrown around, which will cause a lot of angst; in the end we’ll have a model that may have a very different set of indicators and coefficients, but will leave the actual distribution of money across institutions more or less unchanged.  Think of it as a policy process as written by Giueseppi de Lampedusa: everything will change, so that everything may stay the same

Regardless, I’m looking forward to the process, and to writing more about funding formulas.  More later.

February 05

It’s Not Just Demographics

The Council of Ontario Universities (COU) released an amusingly defensive press release last month, just after the high school applications deadline.  After a glancing acknowledgment that applications to university are down in the province for the second year in a row, we are earnestly told: DEMOGRAPHICS!  APPLICATIONS WAY UP IF YOU USE 2000 AS A BASE YEAR!  JOBS!  DEMOGRAPHICS!  MORE JOBS!  DID WE MENTION DEMOGRAPHICS?

I guess COU views itself as a prophylactic against negative press coverage that secondary school applicants to university are now down more than 5% over the past two years (actual applications are down only 2%, but that’s because students, on average, are applying to more schools than before).  And maybe that’s fair enough, because most of the decrease is due to demographics rather than a fall in the actual application rate.  But this attitude is only semi-productive, because while the overall decline in applications may not reflect a change in the public’s view of universities, the changing application numbers are going to produce some pretty dramatic alterations in the province’s higher ed landscape.

Let’s start first at the institutional level.  The only institution where first-choice applications are definitively above where they were two years ago is Nipissing.  Which, you know, thank God because after the way the province screwed them on funding for Education, they could use a break.  On the other side,  seven institutions in Ontario are looking at declines in first-choice applications from Ontario secondary schools of 10% or more: Brock, Guelph, Laurentian, Western, Ottawa, Lakehead, and Windsor.  Ottawa can perhaps afford this since it’s recently had an offsetting surge in Quebec applications, but elsewhere those declines are going to directly impact the bottom line, and result in cuts.  At Lakehead and Windsor, where application drops are 18% and 19%, respectively, the scope of impending cuts looks positively savage.

The numbers are perhaps even more portentous if you look  on a faculty basis.  In most fields of study, numbers are relatively flat.  Science, Business, and Nursing are all fluctuating within a 2% band.  Fine and Applied Arts are up a little bit over 4%, and Engineering is up by over 13%.  But Arts.  Oh my Lord, Arts: down nearly 16% in two years.

No, that’s not a typo.  Sixteen.  One-six.  In two years.

The implications of this are huge.  In the very short-term it’s good news because class sizes will decrease.  But in the medium-term, institutions simply will not be putting money into units where revenue is falling.  So Arts faculties should expect hiring freezes, loss of positions through attrition, reductions in budgets for sessionals, etc.

And remember, this won’t be because Visigothic neo-liberal governments don’t respect Social Sciences and Humanities; it will be because young people simply aren’t interested in studying in these fields.  And the reason they aren’t interested is because starting wages are down 20% or more over the past six years.  Decry their utilitarian approach to education if you must, but the simple fact is that unless Arts faculties get serious about changing program offerings to respond to students’ shifting interests, there are going to be deep program cuts ahead.

That’s something worth talking about, and soon.  The longer we tell ourselves this is just about demographics, the worse things are going to get.

November 10

Three Rules for Politicos

So I see that the Government of Ontario has announced what is possibly the most boutique student aid program of all time.  If students volunteer at the 2014-15 PanAm Games, they will be exempted from the pre-study period contribution (a contribution from the money you earn up to 16 weeks prior to the start of your studies) for 2015-16, and will be get a 12-month grace period on their loans (instead of 6-month) before needing to start repayment.

<puts computer away>

<sighs, drinks some Red Bull, looks out the window wistfully>

<slams head against desk violently, yelling “WHY?  WHY MUST THIS PROVINCE BE GOVERNED SO BADLY?  WHY?>

<Breathes deeply.  Opens computer again>

OK, three things here.  Three things every politician in the country desperately needs to understand:

1)     Exploiting Unpaid Labour =/= Encouraging Voluntarism.  If it’s mandatory – as in “mandatory volunteering hours in high school” – it’s not volunteering.  If you pay for it in kind, it’s not volunteering.  This kind of thing demeans the notion of actual volunteering.

Oh wait, you’re worried that you’re asking someone to do too much for nothing?  Then PAY THEM, you gibbering moron.  Pay them for their work.  It’s not hard: we’ve been doing it since the end of serfdom.

2)     Stop Using Student Aid as an Indirect Government Policy Tool.  This seems to be in everyone’s playbook these days.  Not enough money in the PanAm kitty because you’ve blown it all on buying out incompetent executives?  Use student aid as a way to attract cheap labour!  Having trouble filling rural nursing or legal aid positions?  Use student loan forgiveness as a recruitment tool!

No.  No, no, no!  Student aid is about giving money to students to complete their studies.  If you want to play labour market games, do so directly.  Problem finding nurses for rural areas?  Have the damn Health Ministry pay them more.  Otherwise, you’re sending the message that you only want nurses from poorer families – the ones whose parents couldn’t give them enough money to keep them off student loans – to work in rural areas.

3)     No More Boutique Programs.  Student aid is already way too complicated.  Governments are collectively throwing $5.6 billion into student subsidies – that is, about 78% of the value of domestic tuition fees (institutions throw in another $1.6 billion on top of that).  And yet everyone thinks the cost of education is sky-high: students and parents simply do not understand the subsidies they are being given.  That is a clear sign of policy failure. 

Basically, if you’re thinking up boutique policy in student aid you’re part of the problem, not part of the solution.  I realise this may come as a shock to the Ontario Liberals, who appear not to know any way to govern other than through policy boutiquery, but it’s true.  The priority for the coming years must be to simplify the system, not to tack on more bells and whistles.  Period.

Got that, politicos?  Pay the kids for their work, keep student aid simple, and tell the other ministries to stop using student aid as a way to backstop their own policy failures.  Stick to those three rules, and you’ll do all right.

October 22

Scenario Planning for Ontario and Quebec

Yesterday, we looked at data from 2004 to 2012 to examine income and expenditure trends for Canadian universities, and found that salary and operating budgets were both moving up at a pace of around 4.4% per year in real dollars.  Today, I want to do a bit of scenario planning for the country’s two largest provinces using the same technique of focussing just on operating grants, tuition, and salaries. 


Ontario sits in between two divergent trends – real public funding has been stable or declining for many years, while tuition revenue has been increasing by about 8% per year, thanks mainly to the influx of international students.  As a result, since 2009, operating budgets have been increasing by 3.8% per year, which has been enough to deal with salary mass rises of 3.9% per year.

But can Ontario keep up that pace?  We’re already at the start of a phase where domestic enrolments are declining, and at best government income is going to decrease by about 1% per year in real terms (according to the government’s own budget papers, future increases will be 1%, less than the recent norm of 2%).  So a best guess at what’s going to happen is that government income trajectory will remain negative, and the 8% per year budget increases will start to trail off somewhat.  If this happens – and of course this still depends on ever-increasing international student numbers, which is by no means assured – then current levels of salary mass increases can be tolerated.

But what if things don’t go as planned?  What if international student numbers don’t offset losses from declining domestic student numbers?  What if the Wynne government decides to make one significant cut (say, 5%) in budgets this year to finally get the deficit under control, now that they have a majority government?  In this case, assuming no change in salary mass trajectory, salaries would rise to 82% of combined operating grant and tuition, from 76% today.  That may not sound like much, but let me turn those words around and phrase it another way: in order to accommodate current levels of growth in the salary budget, in a pessimistic scenario, the non-salary portion of the operating budget – light, heat, scholarships, lab supplies, etc. – would need to be cut by 25%.

Figure 1: Budget Scenarios for Ontario, 2012-13 to 2017-18














So the quick summary here is: If you want salary mass increases to continue, find ways to bring those foreign students in.  Otherwise, you either have to accept massive cuts to non-salary areas or a cut in salary growth.


The situation in Quebec is both more straightforward and more problematic than in Ontario.  There, the government has already signalled it will cut funds in nominal terms next year in order to balance the budget.  The only question is what happens afterwards – and I have assumed here that spending will rise again at the rate of projected GDP growth.  Tuition revenue growth was never as high in Quebec (5% per year in real terms) as it was in Ontario, as Quebec doesn’t attract as many international students – there is no obvious reason to think this will change.  On the other side of the ledger, salaries as a percentage of total income is 87% of combined government grants and tuition, compared to 76% in Ontario (if you’re wondering why Quebec universities feel poorer than Ontario ones, there’s your answer right there).  You can come up with other scenarios, of course, but most plausible ones look worse than this.

Put these factors together and you get a pretty ugly picture.  Operating budgets are simply not likely to grow much in the short term, so even a continuation of current salary trends – a 2% real increase per year, or about half what it is in Ontario – would mean salaries rising from 87% of income to 91.4% of income.  Meaning, in short, that without a change in salary policy, Quebec universities would have to cut a third of their non-salary budget in order to make ends meet.

Figure 2: Budget Scenario for Quebec, 2012-13 to 2017-18














Whichever way you look at it, the numbers are ugly.  Compression of salary mass seems almost inevitable in Quebec; for Ontario to avoid the same requires institutions to continue a not-necessarily-sustainable trend of enrolling ever-increasing proportions of international students.

Tomorrow, we’ll get out of central Canada and see how things stack up elsewhere.

July 28

Coming Soon to Ontario: a British Columbia Solution

Unless you’ve been out of the country, or under a rock, for the last couple of years, you’ll be at least vaguely familiar with the concept that the province of Ontario is broke.  So broke, in fact, that it has departed radically from previous practice and, back in 2012, effectively froze physicians’ pay for two years.  Not individual physicians, of course – but on aggregate.  A zero overall increase.  And the government is now working to try to extend this freeze for another couple of years.

That makes good sense.  Health care costs have historically risen at several percentage points above inflation, and have squeezed other parts of the provincial budget (education has held out OK, all things considered, but other budget lines have been less well-protected), and physician costs are a major item in the health care budget.  And so saving money in this area is to be welcomed, even if it is at the expense of physicians – who are a politically tricky group to offend.

So what might the provincial government think of the post-secondary sector handing its employees raises of 3-4% per year, on aggregate?  Do you think aggrieved doctors won’t point to this anomaly during this pay round?  Can you imagine any possible rejoinder the government could offer that would make the least bit of sense?

Don’t you think maybe this situation is about to come to a rather sudden end?

For whatever reason, universities in Ontario have not been able to resist rising wage pressure from full-time faculty.  Despite money getting tighter, they have felt compelled to sign agreements that are plainly beyond their means (Hel-LO, University of Ottawa!).  Some university presidents, unable to deal with this problem on their own, are saying that they need government to step in to play “bad cop”.

What does the “bad cop” look like?  Well, take a look at how BC has handled wage negotiations over the last few years.  There, universities (and all other public sector entities) are given a biennial mandate with respect to employee negotiations.  In 2010 and 2011, the deal was: negotiate what you like, but the net cost of any new compensation deal cannot exceed zero.  In 2012 and 2013, that was changed to: there could be increases, but they had to be balanced dollar-for-dollar with efficiency savings in other areas.  The 2010-11 arrangements, in conception at least, are close to the approach Ontario has taken with its physicians.  And it worked pretty well, at least in the sense that it has kept costs down with a minimum of political fuss.

Not everyone in Ontario agrees that the province needs to take the bad cop approach.  Quite a number of university presidents (you can probably guess which ones) oppose asking the province to legislate on their behalf; not only do they feel it morally incumbent on universities to manage their own books, but also it is tactical suicide to ask governments to legislate – once you go down that road, there’s no telling where they’ll stop micromanaging universities’ affairs.

The problem is, those presidents haven’t exactly been too successful at reigning-in costs, either (hello again, University of Ottawa!).  So it seems almost inevitable that some sort of BC-like solution is on the cards.  The idea that profs could gain 15% in salary over four years, while physicians get zero, simply isn’t politically tenable.

May 27

Ontario Platform Review

The current Ontario election is possibly the most depressing one I’ve ever lived through.  I agree entirely with Laval’s Stephen Gordon, who describes the province as the northern equivalent of Argentina: formerly great, and utterly unable to deal with decline.  Kathleen Wynne isn’t quite Cristina Fernandez, of course, the Liberals aren’t quite Peronists, and Toronto FC sure ain’t Boca Juniors.  But there are still enough parallels to make you go “hmmmm”.

Anyways, where do the three parties stand on post-secondary education?  It’s harder than you’d think to tell, because neither opposition party seems to have put a whole lot of thought and care into their platforms and the associated costing (read Jim Stanford’s quite astonishing deconstruction of the Tory jobs numbers here, for instance).  Still, to the extent intentions can be teased out from current documentation, here it is in a nutshell:

Institutional Grants: Assuming the Liberal Platform is the 2014 Budget, then institutions can look forward to four years of one percent increases in government grants.  Neither the Conservatives nor the NDP have promised any increase at all (though see below on NDP tuition promise).

Student Assistance: The New Democrats say they will make provincial loans interest-free.  Assuming this is not retroactive (that is, it only applies to loans issued in 2013-14 onwards) this is a pretty cheap proposal because the province already forgives about two-thirds of the provincial loans it issues.  My calculation suggests that, at most, this costs about $10 million in year one, and evens out after about four years at a cost of between $30 and $40 million.  The Liberal platform offers nothing more than a re-iteration of how great their 30% tuition rebate grant is.  The Conservative platform says it will eliminate the rebate at a savings of $450-500 million.  This, they claim, is in line with recommendations of Drummond commission, but that’s not actually true; what Drummond actually asked was for all aid, including the grant, to be “reshaped” and made more targeted.   Removing the grant won’t actually save what the Conservatives say it will; the Ontario Student Opportunity Grant will necessarily rise somewhat to compensate.

Tuition:  Implicitly, the Liberal position is a continuance of a 3% cap on tuition.  The Conservatives have said nothing at all about tuition during the campaign, but if their White Paper on PSE is any guide, the policy seems to be modest, across-the-board increases, along with selective deregulation.  The NDP has proposed a tuition freeze and appears to offer partial compensation to institutions.  They offer very little detail so it’s hard to tell for sure, but assuming that the aforementioned interest-free loan promise is only for new loans, there will be about $80 million (rising to $240 million over three years) left over with which to compensate institutions for the lack of fee revenue.  If you exclude international student fees and assume no growth in student numbers, it implies that compensation will be about 2% – or, less than what fees would have brought in, so this pledge would not seem, in fact, to compensate institutions fully for the loss of revenue.

Apprentices:  The Tories really like the idea of dramatically expanding the number of apprentices, for reasons that are somewhat vague.  Their thesis is that the reason this cannot be done is because the ratio of apprentices to journeypersons on worksites is too low.  They would like to raise this ratio in order to increase the number of apprentice spots.  What this would do to the quality of instruction/supervision is not addressed.

Financial Summary:  Based on the foregoing, PSE institutions can expect the following from the three parties:

Liberals: a 1% p.a, hike in the grant, plus 3% p.a. on fees, means budget growth of 2%, plus whatever they can grab from international students.  No change on student aid.

NDP: 0% in the grant, 2% as compensation for the fee freeze means 1% growth, plus whatever can be grabbed from international students.  An extra $10M per year in interest subsidies for students.

PC: As far as can be gleaned from their official documents, the increase is 0% in the grant and likely some increase (how much is unknown) in fees.  Allegedly, student aid will fall by $450-$500 million, but in practice somewhat less than that.

Enjoy the franchise.

May 14

Trends in Applications

Some interesting trend data to review from Ontario today.

First, there’s the fact that applications from secondary schools have dropped by 3% this year, from 92,892 to 89,609 (as of the February snapshot, which for most purposes is as good as the final numbers, since something like 95% of all applicants apply before the end-of-January line).  This is a moderately big deal since it’s the first time since the double cohort that numbers have fallen.

Figure 1: Applications from Secondary Schools by Year, Ontario, 2004-14














Some university officials have waved this away as being a result of declining population, but there’s no evidence that the population of 18 year-olds has fallen by 3%.  Statscan hasn’t published data for 2014 yet, but between 2010 and 2013 the number of 18 year-olds actually increased by 2%, even though the agency’s population projections had suggested their numbers would fall somewhat.  In the chart below, which shows the ratio of secondary school applicants to 18-year-olds over time, I average Statscan’s projection with the actual annual increase for the past four years, and assume a fall of 1.6% in 2014. So even accounting for population change, university applicant numbers are still down.

Figure 2: Applications from Secondary School as a Percentage of 18-Year-Olds, Ontario, 2004-14














The fact that the percentage of 18 year-olds attending Ontario universities has fallen is notable, but we shouldn’t overstate the implications.  In the first place, it hasn’t fallen far – just back to where it was in 2012.  Second, these numbers are only for Ontario applicants; they don’t include all the many international students whose numbers are still rising.  Fact is, most institutions will be OK for awhile yet.

More interesting, perhaps, is what’s going on with applications by field of study.  Check out, for instance, what’s happening with the “big four” fields, which account for slightly over 70% of all enrolments.  Applications to Arts subjects have been falling for some time; in 2003, 35% of all applications were to Arts Faculties, now it is just 27% (albeit of a much larger applicant pool – in absolute numbers they are about where they were in 2003).  Science and Business have more or less kept their share of enrolments steady over time, while Engineering has seen its share grow from 8% to 11%.  That might not sound like much, but in absolute terms it represents an increase of 81%, from 5,515, to 9,984.

Figure 3: Arts, Science, Business, and Engineering Applications as Percentage of Total, Ontario, 2004-14














But look a little more closely at the data, at some of the smaller fields of study, and you can see some really amazing shifts in numbers.  Nursing, by some distance, is the “hot” discipline (not surprising, given the 100% placement rate and the $50K plus starting salaries), with applications increasing by close to 150%.  Social Work has seen applications double, and Math applications are up almost 90%.  Fine Arts applicant numbers have stayed very stable over the past decade; only Journalism has seen a major negative shock, with applications down by over a third from their 2008 peak.

Changes in Application Numbers, Selected Fields of Study, Ontario, 2004-14, Indexed to 2004














The disciplinary enrolment shifts are of significantly more importance than 1-year changes in total enrolments.  They show that, over time, students do in fact respond to changes in labour market conditions, but that it may take a few years for the response to be evident.  Quite properly, students might want to see sustained evidence of change before committing to a different field of study.  And that’s a good thing, whatever the usual Labour Market whiners might say.

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