Higher Education Strategy Associates

September 04

Who’s Relatively Underfunded?

As I said yesterday, there’s a quick way to check claims of relative underfunding in block-grant provinces: take each institution’s enrolment numbers by field of study from Statscan’s Post-Secondary Student Information System (PSIS), plug those numbers into the Ontario and Quebec funding formulas, and then compare each institutions’ hypothetical share of total provincial weighted student units (WSUs) under those formulas to what we know they actually receive via CAUBO’s annual Financial Information of Universities and Colleges (FIUC) Survey.

Simple, right? Well, no, not really, but I have some really talented staff who do this stuff for me (Hi Jackie!), so let’s go look at the data.

Let’s start with Manitoba, where pretty much every second day you can hear the University of Winnipeg making a case about relative underfunding (say what you will about Lloyd Axworthy: the man knows how to keep his message in the newspapers).  But is the claim true?

Figure 1: FTEs, Weighted FTEs, and Actual Funding, Manitoba Universities














Here’s what Figure 1 says:  The University of Manitoba has 69% of the province’s students, but receives 79% of all provincial funding (this is from 2011-12); The University of Winnipeg, on the other hand, has 24% of the students, but only 13% of the total funding.  Clear cut case of underfunding, right?

Well, not entirely.  The fact is that Manitoba has a lot more students in high-cost disciplines than does Winnipeg.  If U of M were in Ontario, it would get 75% of provincial funding; if it were in Quebec (where the formula is slightly more tilted towards medical disciplines), it would get 77% of provincial funding.  So Manitoba receives slightly more funding than it would in other provinces, as does – in a relatively more significant way – Brandon University.  And Winnipeg does receive less than it would if it were in another province: $18 million less than if Manitoba used Quebec’s formula, and $25 million less than if Ontario’s were used.  That’s a big gap, but still less than it would appear just looking at FTEs alone.

Now, on to New Brunswick.  One has to be a little careful about making inter-institutional comparisons with CAUBO data in New Brunswick because of the peculiar arrangement between UNB and St. Thomas (STU).  Because the two share the former’s campus, the provincial government sends UNB a little bit extra (and STU a little bit less) in order to cover extra costs.  So, with that in mind, let’s look at the data:

Figure 2: FTEs, Weighted FTEs, and Actual Funding, New Brunswick Universities














New Brunswick looks a bit different than Manitoba, where the biggest university is overfunded.  In New Brunswick, it’s UNB that actually seems to be doing badly, receiving 50% of all money when, in Ontario, it would receive 54%, and in Quebec it would receive 59% (and remember, that 50% is actually inflated a bit because of the money to support STU students).  The institution that really seems to be overfunded in New Brunswick is Moncton, which is receiving $13 million more than it would if New Brunswick used either the Quebec or Ontario formulae.

So, yes Virginia, relative underfunding does exist in Manitoba and New Brunswick.  This probably wouldn’t be the case if either province ever bothered to put its institutional funding on an empirical footing, via a funding formula.  But that would create winners (likely Winnipeg & UNB) and losers (likely Brandon, Moncton and, to a lesser extent, Manitoba).  And what politician likes to hear that?

September 03

“Relative” Underfunding

Institutions always claim to be underfunded.  Seriously, I’ve been at universities in maybe 25 countries – including Saudi Arabia and the Emirates – and I have yet to find an institution that thought it was overfunded.  The reason for this is simple: there’s always just a little bit more quality around the bend, if only you could buy it (the university down the street has a space-shuttle simulator? We need an actual space shuttle to stay competitive!).  So it’s easy to tune out this kind of talk.

The slightly more sophisticated argument is one of relative underfunding.  That is too say: institution A is getting less than it “should” based on what a selection of other comparable institutions get.  The trick, of course, is to get the comparator right – too often, it’s transparently a plea by institutions in poor provinces to get funded in the same way as some of their peers in wealthier provinces.

One way that governments can avoid this kind of argument is to institute funding formulas (indeed, in many cases, this is precisely the reason they were introduced).  Once a funding formula is created, and institutions are paid according to some kind of algorithm, it becomes tough to argue relative underfunding (that is, unless the formula is specifically re-jigged in such a way as to screw over one particular partner – as Quebec did with its famous “ajustement McGill”).  You can argue that the funding doesn’t weight activities the right way – small institutions tend to argue that fixed costs aren’t properly accounted for, large ones that research activities are never compensated adequately – but you can’t argue being underfunded because the criteria by which money is being distributed are objective.

In Canada, it’s really only Quebec and Ontario that have anything close to pure formula funding, based on input indicators.  Nova Scotia does have a formula, but weirdly only takes a reading of the indicators every decade or so; Saskatchewan has some weird block grant/formula hybrid, which is ludicrously complex for a province with only two institutions.  PEI and Newfoundland don’t really need formulae given that they are single-institution provinces.

That leaves Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and New Brunswick.  In these provinces, money is delivered by block grant rather than on the basis of an algorithm, so there is plenty of scope for institutions to claim being “underfunded” relative to others in their province.   This means that institutions have a perennial rhetorical stick with which to beat government.

Or do they?  In fact, there is a way to check claims of relative underfunding, even in block grant provinces.  All one needs to do is to simply look at the distribution of money across an institution and see if it matches up with the distribution of funds one would see in a province that does have a funding formula (i.e. Quebec and/or Ontario).  If they don’t match, there’s probably a case for underfunding; if they do, there probably isn’t.

Tomorrow, we’ll try this out on Manitoba and New Brunswick.

September 02

Higher Education as a Positional Good

In policy circles, we talk a lot about whether education is a public or a private good (it’s both), and what the implications are for pricing.  But one thing we don’t talk enough about is the extent to which education is a positional good.  And that’s a problem because our decisions on this topic have serious implications for the way we fund higher education.

What’s a positional good?  It’s a good that derives part of its value from the fact it’s valuable, but not everybody has it.  It’s kind of like when a particular article of clothing becomes “cool” – if too many people wear it, it ceases to be cool.  Status goods are a zero-sum game – every time someone else gets something I have, its value to me decreases.

Now think about education.  If too many people get a Bachelor’s degree, its value as a signal of skill goes down, even if everyone’s still gaining the same set of skills.  Think about what that means: the consequence of education being a positional good is that as access to higher education increases, the value of a “plain” Bachelor’s degree decreases, and degree-holders have to find new ways to distinguish themselves.

One way to do this is to focus less on the credential and more on where it was obtained.  Thus, one common pattern in higher education is that as access increases, so too does stratification.  Harvard degrees, for instance, have increased significantly in prestige as access to education has improved. We haven’t seen much of this phenomenon, because – as Joseph Heath recently pointed out – in Canada our most prestigious institutions accommodate a pretty large proportion of our student body.  Combine McGill, Toronto, and UBC and you’ve got about 14% of the entire population (the equivalent for, say, Yale/Harvard/Princeton is about 0.1%).  Since our top institutions don’t confer (much) exclusivity, Canadians look for higher education distinction in the collection of additional degrees.  Hence the explosion in professional Master’s degrees and (to a lesser extent) PhDs.

What makes higher education so weird as a field of policy is that it’s pretty much the only type of status good that governments subsidize.  And that’s really quite weird when you think about it.  What idiot would try to promote universal access to something that, by definition, not everyone can have?

We justify subsidizing degrees because to some extent they do raise skills and productivity, which is good for everyone, not just the people who get the degrees.  But the fact is, when it comes to private returns, in the early career phase at least, what matters is the positional value of the degree.  And not everyone can get into Harvard, or into a PhD program.  If they could, those goods would lose all meaning.  Scarcity is what makes them valuable.

The cry of people who say that there are too many spots in higher education/ law school/ teacher training are really making an argument that there aren’t enough status goods to go around.  That’s in part the consequence of subsidizing education to improve access – you’re bound to get excess demand.

As they say in the computer business, that’s a feature, not a bug.

August 29

Predicting the Effects of Australian Fee De-regulation

If the Australian government’s plan on fee-deregulation comes to pass, what follows will be one of the greatest experiments ever in higher education.  Institutions will have the right to set fees exactly as they want, which begs two questions: what will they do with that power, and what will the effects be?

Let’s start with the first question.  When institutions in England were given the freedom to set tuition fees up to a maximum of £9,000, nearly all of them immediately jumped to that maximum from their previous level of about £3,300.   Contrary to the government’s hopes, no one tried to compete on price.  Thus, the ceiling quickly became the mode.

De-regulation proponents in Australia say that won’t happen this time.  The problem in England, they say, was the existence of a ceiling – it gave everyone a point of reference around which to cluster.  Take away the ceiling and genuine competition will occur as universities figure out how to deliver different combinations of price and value.  Opponents say this is wishful thinking – the first set of fees to be announced by a prestige institution (read: Group of 8 member) will become a de facto cap, and hence the standard to which everyone else will gravitate.

There’s a story doing the rounds in Australia that supports this idea.  A few years ago, the government allowed institutions to raise fees by up to 25%, which pretty much all institutions did, apart from Curtin University in Western Australia.  Instantly, Curtin went from being second preference for local applications (behind the University of Western Australia) to third (behind Murdoch University).  Through market research, they found out that because students and their families can’t judge institutional quality, they judge it based on inputs – so when Curtin chose a cheaper price, the signal families received was that Curtin was of inferior quality.

There are contrary examples, of course.  In England, institutions have power to set fees both for international students and taught (i.e. professional) Master’s programs, and there is lots of variation in pricing.  So what’s the difference?  In a word, guaranteed income-contingent student loans with significant forgiveness provisions.  Domestic undergraduates have them, international and taught Master’s students don’t.  All undergraduates can get a loan to cover their fees up-front, and are not on the hook for the whole amount if their post-graduation incomes aren’t high enough.

So let’s apply that lesson to Australia, which also has an income-contingent Higher Education Contribution Scheme, albeit one with less generous repayment subsidies than England’s.  HECS will still insulate students from the main financial consequences of the new fees, and so, as in Britain, they will likely absorb the higher fees with very little effect on enrolment. As a result, institutions will push the fee levels quite high because they can do so without fear of losing students (the exception will be students who learn at a distance – which is a more significant chunk of the student body in Australia than it is in most other OECD countries).  The likelihood is that they will get quite close to the international student level – and they will do so at nearly all institutions.

The real question is: what will institutions do with that money?  The likelihood is that every penny of the extra $5,000 – $10,000 per year students will be asked to pay will be ploughed back into research for prestige reasons.  It won’t be the access disaster some are predicting, but it’s a bad deal for students nonetheless.

August 28

The Australian Experiment (Part 1)

I spent a good part of this month in Australia, talking to people about the radical program introduced in the May budget.  The basics of the system are as follows:

  • A recently-introduced plan of uncapped places, with the government funding as many students as institutions wish to admit, was maintained; however, the average amount of the per-student subsidy will drop by 20%;
  • Tuition fees will be fully de-regulated.  Institutions will be able to charge what they like, subject to the stipulation that fees for domestic students cannot rise above fees for international ones;
  • Institutions will be required to sequester 20% of all tuition revenue over and above what is required to make good on the cut in government subsidies for students’ scholarships (in conception, this is identical to the 30% tuition set-aside in Ontario);
  • The repayment threshold for student loans will be lowered slightly, and students will for the first time be required to pay real interest on the loan (currently, they pay the loan back in constant inflation-adjusted dollars).

The package is seen as favouring the more prestigious and research-intensive universities (known as the Group of 8 – their version of our U-15), since – it is believed – they will be able to charge the higher fees.  And they have made their intentions plain as to where they will go under the new regime: significantly higher fees, reduced undergraduate intake, and ploughing all the extra money back into research, research, and more research.

(Australian universities conceive of research, rankings, and international students as a kind of iron triangle – they need international students for money, good rankings to attract international students, and research to drive their rankings results.  It’s patently not true – the most international-student-intensive university in Australia is Federation University in Ballarat, which is emphatically not research-intensive – but somehow it drives the discourse to the exclusion of all else.)

As might be expected, the sector isn’t unanimously in support.  Students don’t want the higher debt and the academics union are backing them (though, if universities do get more money, they’ll surely be arguing for much of it to be directed their way through higher salaries).  The most on-the-fence group are the lower-prestige universities, who aren’t convinced the market will let them charge higher fees, and hence see the whole exercise as one of increasing system stratification.

The budget is at risk of not passing; control of the Senate rests with a number of small parties – some of whom are definitely in wing-nut territory (google the terms: “Motoring Enthusiast Party”, “preference whisperers”, and “Jacquie Lambie radio interview” to get a sense of the nuttiness), and the budget contains a number of other highly-controversial reforms, such as introducing fees for doctors visit.  Some think that there’s a deal to be had – acceptance of the fees in return for ditching the student loan interest rate proposals – but this deal is far from certain.

Complicating matters further is that the G-8 seem determined to go ahead and announce their 2016 fee structure next month, even before the package’s fate in the Senate is assured.  This, they claim, is necessary for guidance counsellors and high school juniors to make decisions.  But it’s a hell of a risk – one which raises the stakes for the government.

And what will happen if it passes?  Tune in tomorrow.

August 27

The Problem at the Back End

Yesterday, we talked about how the Canadian aid system was both generous and clumsily organized, what with most of it being delivered through tax credits and loan remissions – neither of which shows up directly to reduce tuition at the time of registration.  This is something that needs to change; if we’re giving students so much money, we should at last give it to them in a form that is both useful and comprehensible.  So why can’t we do it?

Our tax credit system goes back to the Diefenbaker era (backstory here), but it really took off in the late 1990s when the education amount increased nearly eightfold in less than a decade.  Why such an increase?  Well, partly it’s because tax credits are politically convenient at election time – you can count them either as new spending or as tax cuts, depending on what audience you’re talking to.  But it’s also because provinces can’t hijack federal tax credits by diverting the money to other causes (e.g. the Harris or Charest tax cuts), or simply allow federal dollars to push out provincial ones (e.g. the Canada Study Grants for Students with Dependants).  Tax credits go straight from Ottawa to taxpayers.  So even though tax credits are a sub-optimal way of delivering student aid, they are superlative as a displacement-free method of delivering federal money.  If you don’t understand why that matters, you haven’t spent enough time in Ottawa.

Where provinces have built on tax credit nuttiness is by giving out large scale tuition rebates through the tax system.  Most provinces haven’t succumbed to it, but Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and New Brunswick have – and frankly they’ve gone bananas with it.  In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, students who finish a first undergraduate degree or college program qualify for one of those province’s graduate rebates. For graduates that remain in the province, these programs are so generous that literally everyone ends up receiving more in subsidy than they pay in tuition.  In Saskatchewan, students from families earning over $120,000 can end up receiving $34,000 in various forms of grants tax credits, while paying only $26,000 in tuition if they graduate in four years and stay in the province for seven years after graduation.

This, frankly, is nuts.  What’s the point of paying graduates $20K each to stay in Saskatchewan, regardless of pre- or post-study income?  Even if that argument had a smidgeon of validity fifteen years ago when it was introduced (amidst significant out-migration), now that Saskatchewan is a “have” province it looks more than faintly ridiculous.  Doesn’t Saskatchewan have more pressing needs than to pay middle-class kids to do what they were going to do anyway?

If we’re spending all this money making higher education cheap, we should spend it in a way that is more useful and comprehensible than tax credits.  The problem is, these kinds of subsidies are difficult to re-allocate because they benefit so many people.  But finding a way to re-allocate tax credit money is a must.  Stakeholder representative groups could do everyone a service by banding together and working out ways to give governments the necessary political cover to do the right thing.

August 26

What Students Really Pay

In a couple of weeks, Statistics Canada will publish its annual Tuition and Living Accommodation Cost (TLAC) survey, which is an annual excuse to allow the usual suspects to complain about tuition fees.  But sticker price is only part of the equation: while governments and institutions ask students to pay for part of the educational costs, they also find ways to lessen the burden through subsidies like grants, loan remission, and tax expenditures.  And Statscan never bothers to count that stuff.

Today, we at HESA are releasing a publication called The Many Prices of Knowledge: How Tuition and Subsidies Interact in Canadian Higher Education.  Unlike any previous publication, it looks not just at a single sticker price, but rather at the many different possible prices that students face depending on their situation.  We take ten student cases (e.g. first-year dependent student in college, family income = $80,000; married university student, spousal income = $40,000; etc.), and we examine how much each student would be able to receive in grants, tax credits, and loan remission in each of the ten provinces.  It thus allows us to compare up-front net tuition (i.e. tuition minus grants) and all-inclusive net tuition (i.e. tuition minus all subsidies) not just across provinces, but also across different students within a single province.

Some nuggets:

  • On average, a first-year, first-time student attending university direct from high-school, with a family income of $40,000 or less receives $63 more in subsidies than they pay in tuition, after all subsidies – including graduate rebates – are accounted for (i.e. they pay net zero tuition on an all-inclusive basis).  If they attend college, they receive roughly $1,880 more in subsidies than they pay in tuition (i.e. -$1800 tuition);
  • A first-year, first-time student attending university from a family with $40K in Quebec, after all government subsidies, pays -$393 in all-inclusive net tuition.  In Ontario, the same student pays -$200.  But if we were to include institutional aid, the student in Ontario would likely be the one better off, since students in Ontario with entering averages over 80% regularly get $1,000 entrance awards, while students in Quebec tend not to.  For some students at least, Ontario is cheaper than Quebec;
  • On average, college students who are also single parents receive something on the order of $11,000 in non-repayable aid – that is, about $8,500 over and above the cost of tuition.   In effect, it seems to be the policy of nearly all Canadian governments to provide single parents with tuition plus the cost of raising kids in non-repayable aid, leaving the student to borrow only for his/her own living costs.

The upshot of the study is that Canada’s student aid system is indeed generous: in none of our case studies did we find a student who ended up paying more than 62% of the sticker price of tuition when all was said and done, and most paid far less.  But if that’s the case, why are complaints about tuition so rife?

Two reasons, basically.  First, Canada’s aid system may be generous, but it is also opaque.  We don’t communicate net prices effectively to students because institutions, the provinces, and Ottawa each want to get credit for their own contributions.  If you stacked all the student aid up in a comprehensible single pile, no one would get credit.  And we can’t have that.

The second reason is that Canada only provides about a third of its total grant aid at the point where students pay tuition fees.  Nearly all the rest, stupidly, arrives at the end of a year of studies.  More on that tomorrow.

August 25

Back to School 2014

Morning, all.  Ready for the new school year run-down?

One thing already clear is that pretty much the whole sector has finally come to grips with the reality that annual 4% increases in funding aren’t coming back any time soon. That’s causing institutions to think more strategically than they’ve had to in a long time, which is a Good Thing – the downside is that there appears to be some places where this hard thinking is leading to some fairly ugly clashes between management and labour (hel-lo Windsor!).  Contract negotiations this year could be very interesting.

Federally, the big story will likely be how to make the new Canada First Excellence Research Fund work.  Yeah, remember that?  Will it actually make big investments in big universities, the way its U-15 authors hoped?  Or will the usual Canadian political dynamic intervene and turn it into something that distributes excellence funding more widely?  My money’s on option 2, which means in a few years the U-15 will have to convince people to establish an even newer research fund-distributing body, with even tighter funding award criteria.  Fun times.

The spring budget – the last before the next federal election – will almost certainly be about tax cuts, but it will be interesting to see if the feds think there’s something to be gained politically in more higher education spending.  My guess is no, because CFERF was the Tories’ “big swing” for this mandate.  Provincial budgets, I suspect, will all be status quo, but you never know.  The fact is money’s tight, growth is slow, and almost no one (except possibly Alberta) is looking at good times ahead any time soon.  Frankly, we’re only one good financial crisis away from some more swingeing cuts in public spending.

And speaking of swingeing cuts, some of those are on the table Down Under, along with a very radical plan to de-regulate tuition fees.  I spent part of my summer in Australia and New Zealand learning about some of the many interesting policy developments going on there.  Both countries – so similar to our own, yet with intriguing differences – have important lessons for Canadians on the higher education and skills files, and I’ll be talking a lot about them over the next few months, starting Thursday, with a two-part primer on the Australian de-regulation imbroglio.

One of our big summer projects at HESA towers has been following up on our Net Zero Tuition work with a much more detailed look at how students with specific profiles fare in all ten provinces.  It’s possibly the most detailed look ever taken at how student financial assistance plays out on the ground with real students, and we’ll be releasing it tomorrow, and covering it on the blog both Tuesday and Wednesday.  I look forward to the feedback.

But the real event to look forward to this fall is… the Worst Back-to-School Story of the Year Award!  Now in its third year, this award highlights the most ludicrous, under-researched, over-egged story on higher education.  Previous winners include Carol Goar and Gary Mason.  So far this year the back-to-school journalism scene has been pretty quiet, so the field is wide open.  Do send in any nominations to info@higheredstrategy.com.

Back to work!

August 18

Credit-Transfer, Korean Style

There are not many genuinely unique ideas in higher education.  Today, we at HESA are releasing a paper about one of them: Korea’s Academic Credit Bank System (ACBS), available here.

Korea has long had a problem with credit transfer.  Its higher education institutions are fairly rigid in terms of admissions, and few like accepting transfer students.  Another big problem is that Korean males have to do two years (roughly – it depends on the service) of universal military service, and they tend to do it before they’ve finished their higher education. People wanting to combine credits taken from a variety of institutions while on duty were usually out of luck if they tried to get those credits counted at their old institution.

So, in the 1990s, the Korean government started experimenting with new forms of educational credential.  Their first attempt was to create something called the Self-Study Bachelor’s Degree, in which Koreans could basically take a bunch of challenge exams on their own, and obtain a credential.  But the pick-up rate on this was fairly low (lessons here for people who thought MOOCs would create a tsunami of change, had they cared to check), and so the search for solutions was back on.

Eventually, they hit on the answer: if we can’t get existing institutions to agree on transfer credit, why not create a new institution that specializes in granting transfer credit?  In fact, why not create an institution that doesn’t offer any credit of its own, but just develops degree standards and tells people what courses to take in order to meet them?  No more schools telling you: “yeah, you’ve already taken that methods pre-req class, but you haven’t taken our methods pre-req class, so you’ll need to do that material again” – if the class gets accredited by the ACBS, you can use it as a building block to an ACBS degree.

Does it work?  You might say that.  The ACBS now awards roughly 8% of all degrees in South Korea, second only to the Korea National Open Univerisy (KNOU).  It has curricula for over 200 individual fields of study, and increasingly, the ACBS target audience is older and more female, with more and more degrees coming in areas like social work and early childhood education.

Would the ACBS work well outside Korea?  Hard to say: it’s not clear, for instance, that a Canadian ACBS would get a lot of clients.  Yes, the Canadian credit transfer system outside British Columbia and Alberta (which have quite developed transfer mechanisms) is a less a “system” than a barrel full of ad-hoc solutions.  But as I showed back here and here, this ad-hoc-ery  actually works-out okay in practice.  So while a Credit Bank might be a much cleaner solution than the piecemeal kind of approach Ontario has taken through ONCAT, it may also be overkill.

Where this approach might make even more sense is in the US, where, as Cliff Adelman and others have shown, there are millions of people with unfinished degrees who want to get a degree, but who are worried about the time and expense of having to re-start their studies.  The main barrier, really, is: how do you get something like that past accreditation agencies?  But given the potential benefits, it’s a problem worth thinking about.

August 11

Improving Career Services Offices

Over the last few years, what with the recession and all, there has been increased pressure on post-secondary institutions to ensure that their graduates get jobs.  Though that’s substantially the result of things like curriculum and one’s own personal characteristics, landing a job also depends on being able to get interviews and to do well in them.  That’s where Career Services Offices (CSOs) come in.

Today, HESA released a paper that looks at CSOs and their activities.  The study explores two questions.  The first question deals specifically with university CSOs and what qualities and practices are associated with offices that receive high satisfaction ratings from their students.  The second question deals with college career services – here we did not have any outcome measures like the Globe and Mail, so we focussed on a relatively simple question: how does their structure and offerings differ from what we see in the university sector?

Let’s deal with that second question first: college CSOs tend to be smaller and less sophisticated than those at universities of the same size.  At first glance, that seems paradoxical – these are career-focussed organizations, aren’t they?  But the reason for this is fairly straightforward: to a large extent, the responsibility for making connections between students and employers resides at the level of the individual program rather than with some central, non-academic service provider – a lot of what takes place in a CSO at universities takes place in the classroom at colleges.

Now, to universities, and the question: what is it that makes for a good career services department?  To answer this question we interviewed CSO staff at high- medium- and low-performing institutions (as measured by the Globe and Mail’s pre-2012 student satisfaction surveys) to try to work out what practices distinguished the high-performers.  So what is it that makes for a really good career services office?  Turns out that the budget, staff size, and location of Career Services Offices aren’t really the issue.  What really matters are the following:

  • Use of Data.  Everybody collects data on their operations, but not everyone puts it to good use.  What distinguishes the very best CSOs is that they have an effective, regular feedback loop to make sure insights in the data are being used to modify the way services are delivered.
  • Teaching Job-seeking Skills.  Many CSOs view their mission as making as many links as possible between students and employers.  The very best-performing CSOs find ways to teach job search and interview skills to students, so that they can more effectively capitalize on any connections.
  • Better Outreach Within the Institution.  It’s easy to focus on making partnerships outside the institution.  The really successful CSOs also make partnerships inside the institution. One of the key relationships to be nurtured is academic staff.  Students, for better or for worse, view profs as frontline staff and ask them lots of questions about things like jobs and careers.  At many institutions, profs simply aren’t prepared for questions like that, and don’t know how to respond.  The best CSOs take the time to reach out to staff and partner with them to ensure they have tools at their disposal to answer those questions, and to direct students to the right resources at the CSOs.

If you want better career services, there’s your recipe.  Bonne chance.

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